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A grandmaster and an international chess master were compared with a group of novices
in a memory task with chess and non-chess stimuli, varying the structure and familiarity
of the stimuli, while functional magnetic resonance images were acquired. The pattern
of brain activity in the masters was different from that of the novices. Masters showed
no differences in brain activity when different degrees of structure and familiarity where
compared; however, novices did show differences in brain activity in such contrasts. The
most important differences were found in the contrast of stimulus familiarity with chess
positions. In this contrast, there was an extended brain activity in bilateral frontal areas
such as the anterior cingulate and the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri; furthermore,
posterior areas, such as posterior cingulate and cerebellum, showed great bilateral activation.
These results strengthen the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task,
experts activate different brain systems from that of novices. The use of the experts-
versus-novices paradigm in brain imaging contributes towards the search for brain systems
involved in cognitive processes.  
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Un gran maestro y un maestro internacional de ajedrez se compararon con un grupo de
aficionados en una tarea de memoria con estímulos ajedrecísticos y no ajedrecísticos,
variando la estructura y familiaridad de los estímulos, mientras se tomaron imágenes
cerebrales usando resonancia magnética funcional. El patrón de activación cerebral difirió
entre los maestros y los aficionados. Los maestros no presentaron ninguna diferencia
en activación cerebral cuando se compararon distintos niveles de familiaridad y estructura
de los estímulos; en cambio, los aficionados presentaron diferencias en activación cerebral
en dichas comparaciones. Las diferencias más considerables se encontraron en el
contraste de familiaridad del estímulo en posiciones de ajedrez. En ese contraste hubo
una extensa actividad cerebral bilateral en regiones frontales como la corteza cingulada
anterior y los giros frontales superior, medio e inferior; asimismo, áreas posteriores como
la corteza cingulada posterior y el cerebelo también mostraron gran activación bilateral.
Estos resultados fortalecen la hipótesis de que cuando los expertos realizan tareas
específicas de dominio activan sistemas cerebrales diferentes a los que usan los
aficionados ejecutando la misma tarea. El uso del paradigma expertos-versus- novatos
en imaginería cerebral contribuye a la búsqueda de sistemas cerebrales involucrados en
procesos cognoscitivos. 
Palabras clave: memoria, resonancia magnética funcional, pericia, estímulo 
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This article presents a study of memory using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in chess-players. There
is an extensive tradition of research in psychology using
chess-players as research subjects to study cognitive
processes such as perception (i.e., Chase & Simon, 1973b;
De Groot & Gobet, 1996), memory (i.e., Charness, 1976;
Chase & Simon, 1973a; Gobet & Simon, 1996b), thinking
(i.e., De Groot 1946/1978; Gobet, 1998), and visual
imagination (Campitelli & Gobet, 2005; Saariluoma &
Kalakoski, 1997). 
Chess has been chosen as a task environment for
psychological research for the following reasons. First, the
laboratory experiments with chess-players are an ideal
compromise between internal controllability and ecological
validity. In turn, the chess board with chess pieces is a very
simple environment (therefore, controllable), in which an
immense number of possibilities can be generated (2143, see
De Groot & Gobet, 1996). Therefore, it is an ecologically
valid task environment with high controllability and freedom
to manipulate many variables (Gobet & Simon, 2000).
Another important reason to use chess in the laboratory is
the existence of an international ranking (Elo, 1978) that
allows the correct establishment of levels of excellence and
makes it possible to compare different experiments. Lastly,
the databases of chess masters’ games are easily accessible,
which contributes flexibility to generate stimuli.  Therefore,
the use of chess-players and chess tasks is an important tool
for the study of cognitive processes. In this article, we focus
on memory and its neural bases. 
Two theoretically relevant phenomena were discovered
in memory research using chess-players as subjects: Their
performance was poorer in memory tasks when the logical
structure of the specific stimulus of the domain of excellence
was modified, and they maintained their level of performance
in memory tasks when less familiar symbols were used to
represent the position  (i.e., the use of the initial of the name
of the chess piece on the board, instead of the normal symbol
that represents the piece).
The deterioration of their performance due to presentation
of a modified stimulus structure was corroborated in many
experiments using reconstruction of chess positions. De
Groot (1946/1978) presented chess positions for a 2-15 s
time lapse to chess-players of various levels. After presenting
the position, it was withdrawn and participants were asked
to reconstruct it. Recall performance was a function of the
chess-players’ level, with the grand masters achieving scores
of almost 100% of the pieces placed in the correct position.
Chase and Simon (1973b, 1973a) obtained the same result,
introducing a new condition. In this condition, the task was
the same, but the distribution of the pieces on the board was
random, that is, the logical structure of a chess position was
modified. In this condition, the masters’ performance was
almost as poor as the novices’. This result was corroborated
in numerous studies. Gobet and Simon (1996a) performed
a meta-analysis and found that, although the difference in
performance between masters and novices was minimal,
there was a significant difference favoring the former. 
Gobet and Simon (1996b, 2000) presented the templates
theory—an extension of the chunks theory (Chase & Simon,
1973b)—to explain the above-mentioned phenomenon.  The
templates theory maintains that, throughout their careers,
chess-players learn chunks (segments of information) of
typical chess configurations which are stored in long-term
memory. With practice and study, some of these chunks of
3 or 4 pieces are transformed into templates of 10 or 12
pieces. These configurations make up the core of the
template that can be completed by additional information.
This long-term structure is automatically activated when
chess-players perceive a chess position. The more experience
a chess-player has, the more templates stored in long-term
memory; hence, the greater quantity of positions that could
be automatically recognized and, therefore, performance in
recall and recognition tasks would be better.   However, in
random positions, as the logical structure of a chess position
has been modified, there are very few recognizable
configurations, leading to a poorer performance. 
The templates theory was implemented in a computer
model—CHREST (Gobet & Jansen, 1994)—that contains
a “mental eye,” a short-term memory, and a long-term
memory.  The mental eye allows the formation of mental
images, either from retina stimulation or from the activation
of information in memory. The short-term memory is a
vector with a capacity for 4 items, and the long-term memory
contains a discrimination network in which chunks and
templates are formed by means of familiarization and
discrimination processes. This model has successfully
simulated the performance of chess-players of different levels
in memory tasks (Gobet & Simon, 2000), as well as the
chess-players’ eye-movements (De Groot & Gobet, 1996).
It has also simulated problem-solving in computer
programmers (Lane, Cheng, & Gobet, 2001) and language
acquisition (Gobet et al., 2001).
The phenomenon of maintaining the level of performance
when the symbols that represent the chess pieces are modified
was also discovered by Chase and Simon (1973). These
authors replaced the chess pieces with the initials of the
pieces and observed that performance in the aforementioned
memory task was not affected. Saariluoma (1991) and
Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997), using a different task,
substituted the pieces with black dots and obtained no
variation in memory performance. 
Taking into account the two phenomena analyzed, we
designed an experiment in which the structure variables
(logical positions vs. random positions) and familiarity (chess
symbols on a chess board vs. geometrical figures on a grey-
and-white board) were manipulated and we used the fMRI
technique to explore which brain areas were activated in
chess masters and novices. We chose a simple memory task
so that the differences in brain activation would not be
related to differences in performance. 
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Previous studies using neuroimages with chess-players
have investigated various cognitive processes. Nichelli and
colleagues (1994) found brain activation in the left middle
temporal lobe in a task that consisted of determining whether
or not a move was legal.  Onofrj et al. (1995) and Atherton,
Zhuang, Bart, Hu, and Sheng (2003) studied chess-players
who had to solve a chess problem while their brain activity
was recorded. Onofrj et al. found brain activity in the
nondominant superior frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe
(that is, the right hemisphere in right-handed individuals and
the left one in left-handed individuals). Atherton et al. found
left hemisphere activation in the superior frontal lobe and
cerebellum, and bilateral activation in the precuneus and
posterior cingulate cortex. Lastly, Amizdic, Riehle, Fehr,
Wienbruch, and Elbert, (2001) obtained brain images of chess-
players while they played a game against a computer. They
found a different distribution of brain activation in masters as
compared with players of a lower level. The former showed
a relatively more extended activation pattern in the frontal and
parietal lobes than in medial temporal areas, whereas the lower
level chess-players showed a relatively opposite distribution. 
Summing up, the previous studies showed that the tasks
requiring a greater cognitive demand, such as solving a chess
problem or playing a game of chess, tend to activate frontal
and parietal areas (Amizdic et al., 2001; Atherton et al., 2003;
Onofrj et al., 1995). Conversely, tasks that require the mere
retrieval of relevant information, such as chess rules, tend
to activate temporal areas (Nichelli et al., 1994). This is in
accordance with prior studies that showed that the frontal
and parietal lobes participate in maintenance and manipulation
of information or in “executive” tasks, and the temporal lobes
participate in long-term storage of memories (see Cabeza &
Nyberg, 2000, for a review of studies of brain imaging).
We proposed a series of hypotheses concerning the
structure and familiarity of the stimuli presented in each
condition. We considered the possibility that novices would
be less familiar with the chess pieces than with geometric
figures. Hence, the differences in familiarity should be
reflected in brain activation, showing more activation in
areas of maintenance and manipulation of information
(especially frontal areas) for the conditions with chess pieces.
However, differences in structure should not affect them, as
they have no chess experience that would lead them to
differentiate logical positions from random positions. 
In the case of masters, taking into account the scientific
literature, we believe that as long as there is the possibility of
associating a geometric figure with a chess piece (and we
ensured this occurrence by using figures that were similar to
the typical symbols used in chess notations and by requesting
the players to go over the identity of the figure with the pieces),
they would not be affected by the differences in familiarity
because the figures presented would refer to chess pieces (see
Chase & Simon, 1973b; Saariluoma 1991, Saariluoma &
Kalakoski, 1997). In contrast, given the extensive literature
reporting differences in memory task performance between
logical and random positions (see Gobet & Simon, 1996b), we
hypothesize that the  masters will present greater brain activation
in temporal areas (typically related to long-term memory
storage) in the condition of logical chess positions as compared
with brain activation in the random positions condition. On the
contrary, the frontal and parietal areas (typically related with
maintenance and manipulation of information) would not present
differences when comparing these two conditions. 
Taking the above into account, we posed the following
three experimental hypotheses. First, the masters would present
a very different brain activation pattern from the novices.
Second, in the contrast of structure (chess positions vs. random
positions), the masters would display high activation in
temporal areas, whereas the there would be no differences in
the novices. Third, in the two familiarity contrasts (symbols
of normal pieces on a chess board vs. geometric figures on
a grey-and-white board), the masters would not present
differences in brain activation and the novices would show
high brain activation, especially in frontal areas.
Method
Participants
Sixteen healthy volunteers with normal vision signed an
informed consent and participated in the experiment. Two of
them were chess masters (an 18-year-old grand master with
2550 Elo1 points and a 20-year-old international master with
2450 Elo points) and twelve were university students who
knew how to play chess but who had never participated
actively in the game (mean age = 21.4 years, SD = 1.4).
Initially, 19 novices participated in the experiment but 5 of
them were eliminated because they moved their heads more
than was permitted in the criterion we had adopted. The ethical
rules set by the Sir Peter Mansfield Magnetic Resonance
Centre of the University of Nottingham were followed.
Instruments
The experiments were carried out in a scanner in the Sir
Peter Mansfield Magnetic Resonance Centre in the
Nottingham University (United Kingdom). The scanner has
a magnetic field of 3 teslas. The stimuli were presented on
a screen placed at a distance of 220 cm from the participants,
who used prismatic glasses to observe them. 
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1 Elo (1978) developed a ranking that was employed from then on by the International Chess Federation. The World Champion has more
than 2800 points, grand masters typically have more than 2550 points, and international masters have more than 2400 points. A novice would
have approximately 800 points but the International Chess Federation only includes in its lists players with more than 1800 points.
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Images of the entire brain were obtained with 22 coronal
sections every 136 ms, so that the time lapse between the
acquisition of volume 1—the entire brain—and the next
volume was 3 s. The images obtained were echoplanar
images calibrated at T2*. The size of each section was 64
× 64 voxels (three-dimensional pixels). Each voxel used
was 3 × 3 mm in plane and 9 mm thick. At the end of the
experiment, higher resolution anatomical images were
obtained to present the data. 
Procedure
All the blocks of all the conditions had the same structure
(see Figure 1). Each block began with a fixation cross that
appeared on the screen for 13 s, followed by a reference
stimulus for 3 s. After a 5-s delay, a trial stimulus was
presented for 3 s and the participants had to decide whether
or not the trial stimulus was identical to the reference
stimulus. They pressed the right key for “yes” and the left
one for “no.” The participants had to respond within 3 s
after the presentation of the trial stimulus. 
There were four conditions: “chess position,” “random
chess,” “position scene,” and “random scene” (see Figure
2). In the chess position, the stimuli consisted of the right
half of a chess board (4 × 8 squares) with black and white
chess pieces in a logical position of a chess game. In the
random chess condition, the chess pieces were distributed
randomly on the board. There were 10 pieces (5 white and
5 black) in all the positions and in all the conditions. The
stimuli in the position- and random-scene conditions were
made up of a grey-and-white background of an irregular
design of rectangles with the same dimension as the chess
board in the previous conditions and different types of black
and white geometric figures that corresponded to chess
pieces (a cross represented the king, a hexagon the queen,
a square the rook, a rectangular triangle the bishop, an L-
shaped figure the knight, and a rectangle the pawn). The
positions were generated as follows. A logical chess position
was generated by the first author (a chess-player with 2200
Elo points) with 5 white and 5 black pieces, always using
3 pawns, a king, and the fifth piece was either a queen, a
rook, a bishop, or a knight.  In the random conditions, the
pieces corresponding to the same position were replaced
randomly on different squares. In the conditions containing
“scenes,” other chess positions were generated, and
subsequently the pieces were replaced by the corresponding
geometric figures and lastly, the chess board was replaced
by the grey-and-white background already described.  
In 50% of the presentations, the trial stimulus was
identical to the reference stimulus. When it did not coincide
with the reference stimulus, the trial stimulus only differed
in two pieces or figures that were on other squares. In the
conditions of logical chess positions, changing the position
of the pieces corresponded to legal moves, in the case of the
random conditions, the change corresponded to illegal moves. 
Seventy-two blocks (18 for each condition) were presented
in groups of 4 blocks, in which each condition was presented
once. The order of the conditions within the block was
designated randomly. A new stimulus was used in each block. 
Data Analysis
Data were processed with Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM99; Friston et al., 1995). Once the coordinates were
obtained in the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI;
Coscoso, Kollokian, Kwan & Evans, 1997) system, they
were translated into the Talairach (see Talairach & Tournoux,
1988) system, and the Brodmann areas were obtained by
means of the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster, Summerln,
Rainey, Freitas, & Fox, 1997) program.
With regard to the behavioral results, given the low
number of chess-players, we only present the descriptive
statistics. In terms of results of brain imaging, the statistical
model employed was the “autobox” function in convolution
with the hemodynamic response function. Three contrasts
Figure 1. Structure of the block. (See details in text).
Figure 2. Stimuli employed in the experiment. Upper left = chess
position; upper right = position scene; lower left = random chess;
lower right = random scene.
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were planned in the novice group and for each of the
masters: (a) structure contrast: chess position > random
chess2; (b) familiarity contrast 1: chess position > scene
position; and (c) familiarity contrast 2: random chess >
random scene. Parametric statistical maps (SPM) of t values
were obtained after correcting for multiple comparisons.
Only the groups of more than 5 voxels are reported. 
Results
On the average, all the subjects performed much better
than would be expected if their behavior had been random.
The grand master responded correctly on more than 90%
of the trials in all conditions, the international master
responded correctly between 75 and 90% of the attempts.
2 In a contrast, the brain activation obtained in a certain condition is subtracted from that obtained in another condition. The nomenclature “x
> y” means that the voxels presented were activated with (statistically) significantly greater intensity in the condition x than in the condition y.
Table1
Coordinates of the Areas of Greater Local Brain Activation of all the Contrasts in Novice Players
Contrast                    Voxels Hemisphere             Area                    AB t value Z value Talairach coordinates
x            y            z
Chess position > 8 L Temporal gyrus 38 4.89 4.88 –47 17 –8
21 L Inferior frontal gyrus 44 5.05 5.04 –56 15 13
Random chess 6 L Middle frontal gyrus 46 4.72 4.72 –44 30 20
6 L Inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.69 4.69 –47 32 –2
12 L Cuneus 19 4.97 4.96 –3 –77 37
15 R Precuneus 7 4.67 4.67 9 –68 34
7 R Inferior parietal lobe 40 4.68 4.67 62 –33 29
R Inferior parietal lobe 40 4.5 4.49 59 –40 24
276 R Posterior cingulate cortex 29 5.73 5.72 3 –46 8
L/R Posterior cingulate cortex 23 5.14 5.13 0 –22 29
L/R Posterior cingulate cortex 29 5.13 5.12 0 –46 19
1233 L/R Anterior cingulate cortex 32 6.29 6.28 0 33 26
R Superior frontal gyrus 8 6.1 6.09 6 35 53
L Superior frontal gyrus 8 5.74 5.73 –3 17 52
Chess position > 35 L Ínsula 13 5.11 5.1 –42 3 –5
Position scene L Superior temporal gyrus 22 5.01 5.01 –53 0 0
68 L Middle frontal gyrus 10 5.98 5.97 –24 62 8
L Superior frontal gyrus 10 5.19 5.19 –24 52 0
59 R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.88 4.87 27 20 54
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.83 4.82 24 5 49
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.76 4.76 36 0 58
6 L Middle frontal gyrus 46 4.71 4.7 –48 33 20
64 L Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.42 5.41 –53 21 7
167 R Cerebellum 6.19 6.18 30 –59 –12
R Cerebellum 5.18 5.18 36 –45 –20
R Cerebellum 4.59 4.59 45 –63 –27
30 L Cerebellum 5.57 5.56 –42 –51 –28
117 R Thalamus 5.52 5.51 6 –23 4
R Amygdala 5.44 5.43 18 –9 –10
R Brainstem 4.84 4.83 12 –21 –4
Random chess > 6 L Posterior cingulate cortex 31 4.91 4.91 –24 –66 17
Random scene
Note. Voxels = number of voxels activated in the group (when the number of voxels is not presented, it means that this area belongs to
the same group as the previous row). AB = Brodmann’s area; Talairach coordinates: x = negative numbers correspond to the left hemisphere
and positive numbers to the right hemisphere; y = positive numbers correspond to areas in front of the anterior commissure and negative
numbers correspond to areas behind the commissure; z = positive numbers correspond to areas above the anterior commissure and
negative numbers to areas below it.
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Table 1 displays the brain activation areas in the three
contrasts proposed. Only the data of the novices are
presented because the two masters did not present differences
in brain activation in any of the contrasts. 
In the novice players, the chess position > random chess
contrast presented a very limited activation pattern in a small
group of temporal areas and in a somewhat larger group of
frontal areas. The chess position > position scene contrast
presented a pattern of very extensive brain activation in
posterior areas of both hemispheres (i.e., the posterior
cingulate cortex, precuneus, temporal areas, and cerebellum),
but mainly in frontal areas (middle and superior frontal gyri
and anterior cingulate cortex).  In the random chess >
random scene contrast, the novices presented an activation
pattern of only 6 voxels in the left posterior cingulate cortex.
Figure 3 shows a model brain with the brain activations of
the novices in the contrast that presented more activation,
that is, the chess position > position scene. 
As the masters did not present any brain activation in
any of the three contrasts, it could be argued that the lack
of a significant effect was due to a technical flaw during the
experiment or to a lack of sensitivity of the scanner during
their participation. That is, perhaps the reason for the lack
of a significant effect was not that the activations were similar
in the conditions compared but rather because the scanner
did not detect any activation. In order to discard this
possibility occurring with the masters, we performed an
analysis in which we compared their brain activation during
the periods in which the reference stimulus was presented
and the delay when the fixation cross was presented. The
presentation period of the trial stimulus was not taken into
account so as to discard activation in the motor areas
corresponding to finger movement when pressing the key. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the activated brain areas in this
contrast. The fact that the brain activation pattern was
significant in the two masters confirms that their lack of
activation in the three structure and familiarity contrasts was
not due to a technical error or to a lack of sensitivity of the
scanner, but to the fact that their brain activations were
similar in the conditions compared. Thus, the results obtained
allow us to draw conclusions regarding the hypotheses we
had proposed. The analysis of the areas that appear activated
in Figures 4 and 5 is of no interest to the experimental
hypotheses because all the conditions were grouped together.
Figure 3. Novice players. Contrast Chess position > position scene.
Four axial images from top to bottom of the brain, showing brain
activation. 
Figure 4. Contrast trial stimulus plus delay > fixation cross (grand
master). Four axial images from top to bottom of the brain,
showing brain activation.
Figure 5. Contrast trial stimulus plus delay > fixation cross
(international master). Four axial images from top to bottom of
the brain, showing brain activation.
Discussion
Three important results were revealed by this experiment.
First, neither of the masters presented differences in the
relevant contrasts. Second, the lack of significant differences
was not due to a technical problem or to lack of sensitivity
of the scanner. Third, the novices showed a very broad
activation pattern in the chess position > position scene
contrast and very limited activation in the other two contrasts.
With regard to the hypotheses proposed, the results of
the experiment support the hypothesis that stated that the
masters would present a different brain activation pattern
from the novices. The hypothesis stating that the masters
would not present differences in brain activation in the
familiarity contrasts and that the novices would present
important differences in brain activation in these contrasts
(especially in frontal areas) received some support, as three
of the four expected results were produced. Both the results
of the masters in the familiarity contrasts had been
predicted (that is, lack of differences between the compared
conditions). We also correctly predicted the extensive
activation in the novices in the chess position > position
scene contrast. However, the novices’ low activation in the
random chess > random scene contrast was unexpected. 
Lastly, the hypothesis about the structure contrast—
activation in temporal areas in the masters and lack of
differences in the novices—was refuted by the results
obtained because we found no differences in brain activation
in the masters and we did find differences in the novices. 
We shall try to provide a plausible explanation of our
results. In the case of the masters, the lack of significant
differences in the familiarity contrasts was expected, as previous
experiments showed that advanced chess-players are not
affected by the change of a symbol to represent the pieces
(Chase & Simon, 1973b; Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997). The
two masters commented to the experimenter that they easily
memorized the correspondence of the geometric figures with
chess pieces, and this was facilitated by the similarity between
the figures and the pieces, and that during the experiment,
they perceived the figures as if they were chess pieces. 
With regard to the structure contrast, on the basis of the
extensive literature that reports clear differences in masters
in the reconstruction of logical and random positions (see
Gobet, De Voogt, & Retschitzki, 2004 for a bibliographic
review), we predicted a difference in the brain activation of
our masters. However, this did not occur. A possible
explanation is that the simplicity of the task led the masters
to perform the same processes for both stimuli. The differences
found in the literature refer to a recall task (the reconstruction
of the position of each piece in a position presented during
a 2- to 15-s period), and our task was a recognition task. 
With regard to the novices, we had hypothesized that
there would be a familiarity effect (which partially occurred)
and that there would be no structure effect, which did, in
fact, occur.  A possible explanation is that, in the conditions
using chess pieces and the chess board, the visual
representation of the reference stimulus in posterior areas
of the brain may have been generated in a different place
from the representation in the conditions using geometric
figures (this would explain the activation in posterior areas
in the chess position > position scene and random chess >
random scene contrasts). It is also possible that during the
delay period, in both the conditions with geometric figures,
the novices may have performed a similar type of processing
(with the differences in structure having no effect, contrary
to our prediction), which could be a visual review. In
contrast, in the two conditions with chess pieces, the type
of processing would have been different. In the condition
with a logical position, the novices would have performed
some kind of verbal processing (for example, reciting the
name of the pieces) that would require more activation in
modulation areas such as the frontal cortex. On the contrary,
in the random position, the novices, not recognizing a logical
position, would continue to perform the same type of
processing as in the conditions with geometric figures.  This
would explain the existence of brain activation in the frontal
areas in the chess position > random chess and chess position
> position scene contrasts.  In the future, an experiment
using the event-related fMRI technique, in which one can
obtain precisely the activation in each period of the block,
would allow us establish whether or not our explanation is
adequate. 
Lastly, in accordance with previous studies in brain imaging
with chess-players (Amizdic et al., 2001; Atherton et al., 2003;
Nichelli et al., 1994; Onofrj et al., 1995), our study revealed
brain activation in frontal areas of the novices but not in the
masters. This may reflect the fact that, for the novices, the
chess symbols generated an additional demand in the process
of maintaining the information of the reference stimulus and,
therefore, more activation in frontal areas. However, the
masters’ familiarity with the chess symbols resulted in their
not generating any additional processing demand.
The results obtained in this experiment confirm some
of the hypotheses proposed in the scientific literature of
psychology. The difference between expert and novice
players is based mainly on the creation of a long-term
memory with typical configurations (Gobet & Simon, 1996).
The experts are very skilled at using different symbols
quickly, as long as the structure of the stimulus is logical
(Chase & Simon, 1973b; Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997).
In addition, our experiment contributes new information.
First, it provides data about the brain areas involved in the
acquisition of expert knowledge. For example, in contrast
to the masters, the novices require high activation in frontal
areas in the chess position condition, which suggests a switch
in the masters’ type of processing, from anterior to posterior
areas of the brain. 
The paradigm of comparing experts and novices has not
only provided relevant data about the acquisition of levels
of excellence (see Charness, Krampe & Mayr, 1996;
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Cranberg & Albert, 1988; and Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-
Romer, 1993, for theories of acquisition of excellence), it
has also contributed to the generation of theories on cognitive
processes such as perception (Chase & Simon, 1973b),
memory (Chase & Simon, 1973b; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995;
Gobet & Simon, 1996), and thinking (De Groot, 1946/1978;
Newell & Simon, 1972). We believe its use in experiments
of brain imaging will contribute enormously to the
knowledge of the brain systems involved in the above-
mentioned cognitive processes and, especially, in the changes
that occur in these processes in the course of which a novice
player becomes an expert. 
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